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Abstract          
Although it is seen in the literature that defense expenditures are associated 
with various macroeconomic variables, it can be foreseen that there is no consensus 
on the relationship between defense expenditures and inflation. The aim of this 
study is to investigate the relationship between defense spending and inflation in 
NATO countries for the period 1990-2018 examined with, bootstrap panel causality 
analysis developed by Kónya (2006). The analysis results indicate that there is a 
one-way causality relationship from inflation to defense spending in the United 
States, Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, England and Latvia.       
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1. Introduction    
  
The relationship between defense expenditures and inflation, although this 
relation attracted the attention of scientists and policy makers in the post-World 
War II period, there has been little empirical evidence in the economic literature 
since the 1990s. Occured between the years 1938-1975 World War II, the Korean 
and Vietnam wars have led to an increase in defense spending in many countries, 
thus increasing the overall demand during the post-war reconstruction period. 
Therefore, defense spending was believed to be inflationary (Melman 1985; Starr 
et al. 1984; Xu, Su and Tao, 2018: 1). Due to the existence of internal and external 
threats, countries are spending high levels of defense in order to maintain their 
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national security and sovereignty as a deterrent force. The main factors that 
determine the level of defense expenditures are the geopolitical position of the 
countries, wars, changes in the population ratios, problems related to foreign policy, 
arms race with neighboring and rival countries (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002: 4; 
Krugman, 2005: 522; Karakurt et al., 2018: 154-156).                    
Although defense expenditures are associated with many macroeconomic 
variables, there is no common consensus in the literature due to the lack of a 
theoretical model of the relationship between inflation and inflation. As defense 
expenditures can affect inflation, inflation can affect defense expenditures. There 
are two-way causality between defense expenditures and inflation, and there are 
various views in the literature that there is no relationship between defense 
expenditures and inflation (Günana, 2004: 19). With the help of developed 
econometric methods, the relationship between defense expenditures and inflation 
can be examined without the need for theoretical models (Karakurt et al., 2018: 
154-156).  
The study consists of three parts. In the first part of the study, the concepts 
of defense expenditures and inflation are defined according to international 
institutions and the theoretical framework of the subject is shaped. In the second 
part, the relationship between defense expenditures and inflation is explained. Later 
in the literature department of defense spending and inflation, as well as studies that 
examined the relationship of previously been presented literature review of 
empirical studies conducted on the subject in Turkey and other countries. In the 
third part, in the econometric analysis section, the bootstrap panel causality test 
developed by Kónya (2006) after the homogeneity of the variables were tested with 
the data of 1990-2018 period for 25 NATO countries. For the cross-sectional 
dependence, Breusch and Pagan (1980), Pesaran and Yamagata (2008) and Swamy 
tests were applied. The number of studies examining the relationship between 
defense expenditures and inflation is quite low in the literature. Therefore, in this 
study, the relationship between defense expenditures and inflation, Kónya (2006), 
II. generation panel causality tests were applied. In addition, the fact that there are 
no studies for NATO countries after a detailed literature review in the literature on 
this subject reinforces the idea that the study will contribute to the literature as an 
original study.  
2. Definition of Military Expenditures and Inflation Notions    
According to Ojo (2000), the notion of inflation is defined as the continuous 
and permanent increase in prices of goods and services in general. Inflation rate is 
measured as a percentage change in producer, consumer and wholesale price index. 
According to Essien (2005), the consumer price index (CPI) measures the average 
price of a representative basket of goods and services purchased by consumers. 
According to various economic schools, inflation theories explain the causes of 
inflation with different assumptions. In the classical and neoclassical approach 
based on the quantity theory of money, the increase in money supply increases the 
general level of prices at the same rate. The struggle against inflation is associated 
with monetary policy. According to the Keynesian model, which explains the 
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inflation due to excessive demand pressure, it is stated that it is caused by excessive 
deficits and excessive increase in public expenditures. It is aimed to reduce 
aggregate demand by combating inflation and using fiscal policy tools. In the Neo-
Keynesian approach, which explains inflation with the Philips curve, the main cause 
of inflation is demand-side shocks. In this approach, monetary wages are assumed 
to result from delayed adaptation to changes in prices and aggregate demand. In the 
monetary approach, the concept of inflation is explained by the expanded Philips 
Curve model. According to this approach, besides the fact that inflation is seen as 
a monetary phenomenon, the increase in money supply reduces the real growth rate 
and unemployment rate in the economy in the short term. In the long run, this real 
effect disappears and only inflation increases. The structuralist approach explains 
inflation based on cost-push inflation theory. According to this approach, inflation 
is expressed as a supply-side situation that changes the profit expectations by 
increasing the unit costs of the private sector. According to the rational expectations 
approach, assuming that the economic units have full information, it is accepted 
that if the monetary authorities inform the monetary expansion, they will expect the 
increase in prices and adjust themselves to the expectations. In case of unexpected 
monetary expansion, it will have an impact on real output and employment. 
According to the new classical approach, negative supply shocks are suggested to 
cause inflation. In the new keynesian model, it is stated that a possible demand 
shock due to the determination of monetary wages through long-term contracts will 
not have the effect of inflation immediately and will be gradual (Akçacı Karapınar 
and Kocağ, 2013: 3).                                                        
According to the Neo-Keynesian, there are three types of inflation. First, the 
increase in money supply is due to the increase in public expenditures. Demand 
inflation, when total demand exceeds the current supply capacity. The second is 
cost-pull inflation. It is due to the increase in costs. It is also known as inflation 
caused by supply shocks. It is due to the decrease in the total supply resulting from 
the increase in costs (Thomas, 2006). The third is structural inflation, commonly 
known as the type of inflation resulting from changes in monetary policy. There are 
various types of inflation depending on the intensity and continuity of the price 
increase. Hyperinflation ranging from 50 percent to 100 percent, accelerating three-
digit percentage point annual price increases, chronic inflation at 15-30 percent and 
5 consecutive years, and high inflation at 30-50 per year. There is also moderate 
inflation in the general price range of 5 percent to 25-30 percent and low inflation 
in the range of 1-2 percent to 5 percent. In inflation rates below zero, it is defined 
as the deflation of a country (Piana, 2001).      
The notion of defense spending is defined differently by international 
organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the 
United Nations (UN). According to NATO, which was established in 1950, all 
current and capital expenditures of the armed forces, military R&D, training and 
equipment expenses of military personnel, military operation expenses, pensions of 
civil personnel working in military institutions, execution of state institutions and 
space projects operating in defense projects. It consists of expenditures made for 
the purpose (NATO, 2010).    





The UN defines the definition of defense expenditure based on the definition 
of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). According to 
SIPRI (2010), defense expenditures, all current and capital expenditures of the 
armed forces, including peacekeeping, as well as personnel expenditures for 
military operations and military purposes, military and civil pension salaries, Social 
services expenditures for military personnel and their families, maintenance, 
procurement, military research and development, military construction and military 
assistance (military expenditure of the donor country). Excluded military 
expenditures consist of civilian defense expenditures, veteran aid, mobilization 
expenditures, transformation of arms production facilities and current expenditures 
for military activities such as weapon destruction (www.sipri.org). According to 
UN military experts, it is difficult to make a common definition around the world 
due to the lack of detailed information on military expenditures.     
 3. The Relationship Between Military Expenditures and 
Inflation              
Defense expenditures have different effects on various economic variables. 
Besides economic indicators, important variables such as foreign trade, balance of 
payments, inflation and employment are examined under the effect of defense 
expenditures (Kaya, 2013: 17-38; Doğdu, 2018: 117). Defense spending has an 
inflationary effect in economies with less supply in terms of total supply, leading 
to higher investment and growth, leading to increased profitability. However, an 
expectation that inflation will increase will increase consumption and reduce 
savings. This reduce in savings will lead to lower investments and a decrease in 
growth potential (Ali and Ather, 2014: 29). According to the view that, defense 
expenditures are inflationary, it is suggested that military expenditures lead to 
inflation (Dumas, 1977; Melman, 1978; Thurow, 1981; Franko, 1982). This is 
because defense spending is interpreted to be inefficient, incur additional 
purchasing power and unproductive, unlike other forms of economic activity 
(including public spending in different areas). Melman (1978) argues that, due to 
the small number of firms providing military service activities, firms will act with 
cost maximization and in this context, the increase in costs will increase prices and 
have an inflationary effect.     
Schultze (1981), states that too much military spending will lead to 
bottlenecks and shortages and will affect the productivity of the industry. The effect 
of defense expenditures on the general price level can be expressed by the change 
in total demand and total supply. On the demand side, the rapid increases in defense 
spending will cause inflation and accelerate the increase in nominal demand unless 
they are offset by tax increases or nominal monetary growth decreases. Kaufman 
(1972) and Capra (1981) argue that inflation is a strong factor in increasing defense 
spending. Inflation increases have an impact on costs and cost overruns. The larger 
defense budget advocates emphasize the need for an increase in defense spending 
in order to compensate for inflation and maintain the targeted level of defense 
spending (Günana, 2004: 23, 24, 27). 
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Hamilton (1977) and Stein (1980) argue that defense spending is 
inflationary, increase in defense spending and war costs are more likely to be 
preferred than the increase in inflation rather than tax increases (Starr et al., 1984: 
106). The demand shock caused by the increase in aggregate demand leads to 
demand inflation or the supply shock caused by the decline in aggregate supply 
leads to increased input costs and cost inflation (Akçacı et al., 2013: 3). According 
to Benoit, particularly in developing countries, defense spending will have a 
stimulating effect on demand and inflation resulting from the increase in demand 
will be seen. According to Benoit, high level of defense spending will lead to a low 
level of inflation in the economy and this situation is due to the increase in demand 
due to defense expenditures. This means that inflation resulting in the use of the 
country's current production capacity (Benoit, 1978: 271-280; Türk, 2007: 44).                
 
4. Literature Review          
Benoit emphasized the importance of inflation in the relationship between 
defense spending and economic growth and stated that the increase in defense 
spending in countries other than hyperinflation would result in inflation and that 
there was a positive relationship between defense burden and inflation. The 
abandonment of tight fiscal policies for financing defense expenditures resulted in 
higher inflation, while the defense level in countries with moderate inflation would 
increase economic growth due to the use of unproductive resources (Benoit, 1978: 
278). 
Starr et al. (1984), 1943-1989 period in the United States, United Kingdom, 
France and Germany with impact-response and variance decomposition methods 
and causality tests examined the study, the United Kingdom and the United States 
concluded that there is no relationship between defense spending and inflation, It is 
concluded that there is a two-way causality in France and Germany. 
Vitaliano (1984) concluded that there was no causal relationship between 
defense spending and inflation. Nourzad (1987) reconsidered the work of Vitaliano 
(1984) using the expected inflation rate and concluded that defense spending 
positively affected inflation. 
Looney (1989), in his study examining the arms-producing countries and 
non-arms-producing countries separately, concluded that defense spending in arms-
producing countries caused cost inflation, while increasing defense spending in 
arms-producing and non-arms-producing countries increased demand and led to 
inflation in the economy. 
Kinsella (1990) examined the 1943-1989 period for the United States and 
concluded that there was no relationship between defense spending and inflation. 
In addition, Kinsella (1990: 296) stated that the pressure on the general level of 
prices to increase due to excessive capacity utilization and increasing tax rates due 
to the increase in demand for national resources during wartime has been explained 





by the high level of defense expenditures having an inflationary effect (Karakurt et 
al., 2018: 159, 160). 
Baek (1991) also examined the period 1956-1989 for the United States and 
concluded that the increase in inflation rate affected defense spending. Payne and 
Ross (1992) concluded that there was no causal relationship between defense 
spending and inflation.    
Sahu et al. (1994) examined the effect of defense spending and non-defense 
public spending on inflation for the UK in the 1960-1989 period in a closed 
economy with the Philips curve and IS-LM model, which increased expectations. 
They concluded that defense spending had an inflationary effect. 
Günar (2004) examined for the 1950-2001 period and defense expenditure 
and Turkey have been unable to determine the short and long term cointegration 
relationship between variables between inflation and has concluded that there is 
bidirectional causality. 
Tzeng et al. (2008) examined the relationship between defense expenditures 
and inflation with the internal monetary growth model. They concluded that the 
effect of the increase in defense spending on inflation was uncertain. 
Özsoy (2008), their study examined the 1970-2004 period for Turkey, 
defense spending and have concluded that there is cointegration and causality 
between inflation in the long term. 
Özsoy and Silk (2010), the 1980-206 period, Turkey, Egypt, Israel and the 
studies they examined for Jordan, Egypt and Israel on the one-way correlation was 
found in other countries, inflation in defense spending were not detected any causal 
relationship. 
Lin (2012) examined the effect of increasing defense expenditures on 
inflation with the internal growth model and concluded that if defense expenditures 
were financed by money and other public expenditures were financed by taxes, the 
increase in defense expenditures would lead to a decrease in inflation and an 
increase in economic growth. 
Aiyedogbon et al. (2012) found no relationship between defense spending 
and inflation in their study of Nigeria for 1980-2010 period. 
Silk (2014), Turkey and Israel for defense spending and inflation thin 
relations, defense spending in the short term is unidirectional causality inflation has 
identified for Turkey.    
Hung-Pin et al. (2016) examined the period of 1955-2010 for China, Japan, 
South Korea and Taiwan. In the long run, the rise in defense spending has led to 
low inflation in China and Japan, while it has led to low inflation in Taiwan. 
Xu et al. (2018) examined the 1953-2014 period with Wavelet analysis for 
China. They concluded that defense spending did not have an inflationary effect in 
China but that defense spending reduced the growth during peace periods. 
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Karakurt et al. (2018), working in the 1966-2016 period examined the Maki 
(2012) structural break cointegration test and Toda Yamamoto causality test for 
Turkey in defense spending and inflation in the long term have concluded that there 
is unidirectional causality. When the literature is examined, it is seen that the 
relationship between defense expenditures and inflation varies from one country to 
another and no common consensus can be reached.         
    
5. Econometric Analysis        
In this study, Breusch and Pagan (1980) horizontal cross-sectional 
dependence, using Pesaran and Yamagata (2008) Swamy test, using defense 
expenditure and inflation data for 25 NATO countries (except Albania, Bulgaria, 
Iceland and Montenegro) in the 1990-2018 period. bootstrap panel developed by 
Kónya (2006). Annual data on defense expenditure/GDP ratio were obtained from 
SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) and annual inflation data 
from World Bank Data. Econometric analyzes were analyzed using Gauss 10 
econometric program.        
In the study examining 25 NATO countries, the econometric models established 
are as follows: 
Inf =     𝛽0 + 𝛽1Defence +  𝑢𝑖                                                                                        (1)  
Defence =   𝛽0 + 𝛽1Inf +  𝑢𝑖                                                                                          (2)  
 
Equation 1 expresses the effect of change in defense expenditures on 
inflation. The variable 𝛽0 in the model represents the constant term, 𝛽1 variable 
represents the defense expenditure variables. 𝑢𝑖 represents the error term for the 
model. In the model, while defense expenditures are taken as the independent 
variable, the inflation variable is taken as the dependent variable. 
Equation 2 expresses the effect of change in inflation on defence 
expenditure. The variable 𝛽0 in the model represents the constant term, 𝛽1 variable 
represents the inflation variables. 𝑢𝑖 represents the error term for the model. In the 
model, while inflation are taken as the independent variable, the defence 













Table 1. Horizontal Section Dependence Test Results of Variables         
Variables: Defence Expenditures Inflation 
Tests Statistic P-Value Statistic P-Value 
CDLm1 (Breusch, Pagan 
1980)  
1320.676** 0.000 627.696** 0.000 
CDLm2 (Pesaran, 2004 
CDlm)                  
41.669** 0.000 13.378** 0.000 
CDLm (Pesaran, 2004 
CD) 
17.330** 0.000 3.378** 0.000 
Bias-adjusted CD test -3.309 1.000 0.072 0.471 
Note: ***, **, * indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
In the Breusch and Pagan (1980) study, where the cross-sectional 
dependence is considered, the test statistic is as follows (Pesaran et al., 2008; Şahin, 
2018: 290):    
𝐿𝑀 = 𝑇 ∑ ∑ ?̅?𝑁𝑗=𝑖+1 𝑦, 𝜒
2𝑁−1
𝑖=1 𝑁(𝑁 − 1)/2                                                                    (1) 
The test statistics developed by Pesaran (2004) are as follows (Pesaran et al. 
2008): 
𝐶𝐷 = √2𝑇/𝑁(𝑁 − 1) (∑ ∑ ?̅?𝑦𝑁𝐽=𝑖+1
𝑁−1
İ=1 )                                                                    (2) 
Pesaran et al. (2008) developed CDLMadj tests, based on this variance and 











𝑁(0,1)                                                    (3) 
The hypotheses of the test are as follows. The null hypothesis states that 
there is no horizontal cross-sectional dependence; The alternative hypothesis states 
that there is a cross-sectional dependence.       
Table 1 indicate that cross-sectional dependence test results of the inflation 
and defense expenditures variables. CDLm1 (Breausch, Pagan 1980), CDLm2 
(Pesaran, 2004 CDlm) and Bias-adjusted CD tests are important for interpreting the 
cross-sectional dependence when T>N. According to CDLm1 (Breausch, Pagan 
1980), CDLm2 (Pesaran, 2004 CDlm) cross-sectional dependence test tests, the ‘no 
cross-sectional dependence’ hypothesis 𝐻0 was rejected at 5% significance level, 
so there was a cross-sectional dependence on defense expenditures and inflation 
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Table 2. Testing for Homogeneity in Models      
Tests Model 1 Model 2 
Y: Inflation 
X: Defence Expenditure 
Y: Defence Expenditure 
X: Inflation 
Test Stat. Prob. Test Stat. Prob. 
Delta_tilde 0.239 0.405 3.745*** 0.000 
Delta_tilde_adj 0.253 0.400 3.955*** 0.000 
Note: ***, **, * express heterogeneity according to significance levels of 10%, 5% 
and 1%, respectively.    
     
Pesaran and Yamagata (2008) developed the Swamy test. In the test, it is 
checked whether the slope coefficients differ between the horizontal sections. The 
null hypothesis of this test is homogeneity; the alternative hypothesis expresses 
heterogeneity (Şahin, 2018: 290). The homogeneity or heterogeneity of coefficients 
in panel data studies is an important step in determining cointegration and causality 
analyzes. Homogeneity, all countries/regions and so on. while expressing the slope 
coefficients calculated for units such as βi’s are equal to β, which is a single slope 
coefficient; in heterogeneity, at least one of the units βi’s is different.  
Pesaran and Yamagata (2008) developed two statistics to test homogeneity. 
These are (∆̃) and (∆̃𝑎𝑑𝑗) statistics (Gül and İnal, 2017: 75). 'Variables are 
homogeneous' according to the results of the delta-tilde (∆̃) ve telda-tilde-adj (∆̃𝑎𝑑𝑗) 
homogeneity tests given in Table 3, in which the homogeneity results of the study 
are given, the hypothesis of 𝐻0 is rejected %5 and %10 significance level in the 
second model. The βi slope coefficients of the variables used in the model are 
heterogeneous. In the first model, where the inflation variable is taken as a 
dependent variable, the hypothesis Ho could not be rejected because the P - 
probability - value is greater than 0.05, ie the first model is not heterogeneous and 
homogeneous.   
Many causality tests are used in panel data studies. Since the cross-sectional 
units are heterogeneous units that are affected by each other, Kónya (2006) panel 
causality test method, which gives effective results under horizontal cross-section 
dependence and heterogeneity, can be applied only for the second model. In the 
Kónya (2006) approach, the cross-sectional dependence is tested using the SUR 
estimation method and the direction of causality is tested using the Wald test 
statistics. Konya (2006) bootstrap panel causality test was used in the study and 
Table 4 shows the findings related to the analysis. After determining the presence 
of cross-sectional dependence and country-specific heterogeneity, it is appropriate 
to use the panel causality method proposed by Kónya (2006), which explains both 
horizontal cross-sectional dependence and slope heterogeneity (Menyah et al., 
2014: 391).        
 
 





Table 3. Horizontal Section Dependence Result in Model 
 Statistics P-value 
LM (Breusch, Pagan 1980)  7631.973*** 0.000 
CDlm (Pesaran, 2004 CDlm)                  299.327*** 0.000 
CD (Pesaran, 2004 CD) 87.158*** 0.000 
LMadj (Pesaran et al. 2008)  -2.193 0.986 
Note: ***, **, * indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
As can be seen in table 3, the horizontal model dependency test results are 
seen in the second model, where defense expenditures are taken as dependent 
variables. According to LM (Breausch, Pagan 1980), CDLm (Pesaran, 2004 CDlm) 
and CD (Pesaran, 2004 CD) horizontal cross-sectional dependence tests, there is no 
cross-sectional dependence test according to 𝐻0 hypothesis, there is a horizontal 
cross-sectional dependence in the model at a significance level of 10 percent.            
Kónya (2006) The following equations are estimated according to the panel 
causality test approach (Kónya, 2006: 981): 
 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 =∝1,1+ ∑ 𝛽
𝑙𝑦1
𝑖=1 1,1,𝑖
𝑦1,𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾1,1,𝑖
𝑙𝑥1
𝑖=1
𝜒𝑘,1,𝑡−1 + ℰ1,1,𝑡 
                                 𝑦2,𝑡 =∝1,2+ ∑ 𝛽
𝑙𝑦1
𝑖=1 1,2,𝑖
𝑦2,𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾1,2,𝑖
𝑙𝑥1
𝑖=1 𝜒𝑘,2,𝑡−1 + ℰ1,2,𝑡     (4)                
  𝑦𝑁,𝑡 =∝1,𝑁+ ∑ 𝛽
𝑙𝑦1
𝑖=1 1,𝑁,𝑖
𝑦𝑁,𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾1,𝑁,𝑖
𝑙𝑥1
𝑖=1
𝜒𝑘,𝑁,𝑡−𝑖 + ℰ1,𝑁,𝑡 
 
and 
    𝜘𝑘,1,𝑡 =∝2,1+ ∑ 𝛽2,1,𝑖
𝑙𝑦2
𝑖=1
𝑦1,𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾2,1,𝑖
𝑙𝑥2
𝑖=1
𝜒𝑘,1,𝑡−1 + 𝜀2,1,𝑡 
 
                              𝜘𝑘,2,𝑡 =∝2,2+ ∑ 𝛽2,2,𝑖
𝑙𝑦2
𝑖=1 𝑦2,𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾2,2,𝑖
𝑙𝑥2
𝑖=1 𝜒𝑘,2,𝑡−1 + 𝜀2,2,𝑡     (5)                
 
     𝜘𝑘,𝑁,𝑡 =∝2,𝑁+ ∑ 𝛽2,𝑁,𝑖
𝑙𝑦2
𝑖=1
𝑦𝑁,𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾2,𝑁,𝑖
𝑙𝑥2
𝑖=1
𝜒𝑘,𝑁,𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜀2,𝑁,𝑡 
         
The variables y and x are the number of horizontal cross-sectional units (i = 
1,2, ..., N), the time period t (t = 1,2, ..., T), and the delay length l, mly and mlx, 
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respectively. Refers to the delay lengths for y and x. Causality relationship and 
direction Wald statistics are obtained by comparing the critical values specific to 
the horizontal cross-section unit obtained by bootstrap method. If the Wald statistics 
are higher than the bootstrap critical values, the null hypothesis that no causality 
exists is rejected (Şahin, 2018: 291).      
In the equations, y is the real GDP, x is the economic complexity index, N 
is the number of observations (j = 1, ...., N) and t (t = 1, ...., T) is the period. This 
test is based on country-specific bootsrap critical values, the Wald test and the 
Apparently Unrelated Regression (SUR) estimation. This approach has two 
advantages. First, it does not require a single hypothesis for the entire panel. 
Therefore, it is possible to carry out a causality test separately for each panel. In 
other words, the panel is not assumed to be homogeneous. Second, it does not 
require pre-tests such as cointegration and unit root tests. According to this 
approach, it is possible to obtain the bootstrap critical value for each country 
separately (Kónya, 2006: 979). In the study, Akaike information criterion which is 
foreseen in Kónya (2006) study was taken into consideration as lag length (Yıldız 
and Akbulut, Yıldız, 2019: 335, 336). 
The panel data approach developed by Kónya (2006) is based on Wald 
statistics with seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) and country-specific 
bootstrap critical values. This test has 2 advantages. First, it does not require 
common hypotheses for all of the horizontal cross-section units forming the panel. 
By allowing simultaneous correlation between the horizontal section units, the 
panel allows the use of extra information provided by the data. Second, it does not 
require any pre-testing except the proper delay structure. In this approach, as the 
causality test results are critically dependent on the delay structure, the number of 
delays must be determined before proceeding to estimate. There is no simple rule 
to decide the maximum number of delays. However, in this test, the optimal lag 
length is assumed to be between 1-4 to minimize the Akaike Information Criterion 
and the Schwartz Criterion (Konya, 2006, 979-982).        
As a result, according to this test, Wald statistics are compared with the 
critical values obtained for each horizontal section unit obtained by bootstrap 
method in order to determine causality relationship. When it is found that the Wald 
statistic for any horizontal section unit is greater than the bootstrap critical value, it 
is said that there is a causality relationship between the variables, or vice versa 
(Altıner and Yavuz, 2019: 942).      
 









Table 4. Kónya (2006) Bootstrap Panel Causality Test Results                  
                                   𝐻0: Inflation is not a Cause for Defense Expenditures  
                                   𝐻1: Inflation is the Cause of Defense Expenditures 
Countries Wald Stat.  Bootstrap 
Prob. Value  
Critical Value  
%1 %5 %10 
Germany 76.897 0.199 442.079 197.33 134.68 
Belgium 11.247 0.543 299.584 146.93 97.856 
United States  29.962*** 0.099 184.096 53.479 29.583 
Czech Republic  112.390*** 0.082 363.629 154.59 98.669 
Denmark 13.121 0.512 294.518 159.15 110.77 
Estonia 619.480*** 0.004 363.554 159.59 111.22 
France 10.742 0.465 196.751 103.47 62.506 
Croatia 113.394*** 0.093 440.270 180.94 102.23 
Netherlands 14.803 0.587 516.503 222.48 151.70 
Italy 16.841 0.413 195.033 112.34 69.807 
Spain 17.149 0.674 365.602 212.41 144.03 
Canada  1.293 0.839 222.827 113.94 81.167 
Latvia 68.629*** 0.124 251.701 105.69 76.222 
Lithuania  4.707 0.805 445.070 246.31 146.93 
Luxembourg 3.862 0.680 209.997 120.79 77.267 
Norway 91.672 0.371 854.686 446.05 304.07 
Hungary 16.593 0.778 680.228 395.32 299.66 
Poland 0.014 0.992 437.392 191.83 131.36 
Portugal 36.933 0.363 409.315 223.82 139.59 
Romania 0.466 0.810 111.086 49.051 30.793 
Slovakia 33.060 0.351 374.434 180.51 112.90 
Slovenia 1.023 0.723 134.852 57.847 33.493 
Turkey 35.287 0.255 256.579 124.74 81.273 
Greece  5.037 0.644 262.879 123.78 80.013 
England  323.819*** 0.063 625.138 350.53 259.46 
Panel Fisher statistics value       : 58.930 
Panel Fisher probability value   : 0.181              
Note: ***, **, * represent 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels of the null 
hypothesis, respectively. Critical values were obtained with 1000 boostrap cycles 
and Akaike: 1 lag length.       
  
According to Table 4, for the United States, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Croatia, Latvia and the England, the hypothesis 𝐻0 was rejected and the 𝐻1  
hypothesis was accepted as defense expenditure not the cause of inflation at a level 
of significance of 10%. It is concluded that there is a one-way causality relationship 
from inflation to defense expenditures for this countries. Statistically significant 
relationship was not found for other NATO countries. According to the Panel Fisher 
probability value, 𝐻0 hypothesis ‘defense expenditures that are not the cause of 
inflation was rejected at %10 significance level and 𝐻1 hypothesis was accepted at 
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10% significance level. When the panel is evaluated in general, it was not 
determined that there was a one-way causality relationship from inflation to defense 
spending for 25 NATO member countries.               
                  
6. Results                                   
The aim of this study is to examine the relationship between inflation and 
defense expenditures in 25 NATO member countries for the period 1990-2018. 
Clearly, the relationship between defense spending and inflation has a very complex 
relationship. The direction and size of the relationship varies from country to 
country. As a result of the Kónya (2006) Boostrap Panel causality analysis, it was 
concluded that there is a one-way causality relationship from inflation to defense 
expenditures in 25 NATO member countries in the England, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Croatia, the United Kingdom and Latvia. In addition, when the panel was 
examined, a one-way causality relationship was not found for 25 NATO member 
countries from inflation to defense expenditures. The analysis results of Özsoy 
(2008), Özsoy ve İpek (2010), Vitaliano (1984), Payne ve Ross (1992) coincide 
with the analysis results of our study.                                  
The method of financing defense expenditures and the economic conditions 
are shaped depending on the strength of the national currencies of the countries. 
Increased inflation decreases the purchasing power for defense expenditures. 
Therefore, countries may have to increase their nominal expenditures in order to 
maintain their real level of defense expenditures. In countries where the countries 
are in disagreement and alliance, a possible inflation may affect the defense 
expenditures of the countries. Inflation is an important factor due to the increase in 
the cost of defense expenditures. According to the advocates of more budget 
devotion to defense expenditures, they emphasize the importance of the increase in 
defense expenditures in order to eliminate the inflation increase and maintain the 
targeted defense expenditure level. 
Macroeconomic variables such as exchange rates, inflation and interest rates 
can affect each other in various ways. Exchange rate is an important factor in 
explaining inflationary effects in open economies. The change in the exchange rate 
changes the prices of the inputs subject to export and import and affects the prices 
of final goods. One of the most important factors leading to an increase in public 
expenditures is the decline in the value of money. This is the case in countries where 
inflation is valid. Among the reasons for the increase in public expenditures of the 
NATO countries discussed in the study, it can be concluded that as a result of the 
decrease in the value of the national currency of the countries, these countries 
increase their defense expenditures by increasing their costs.       
As a policy proposal, it can be stated that NATO countries should follow 
effective policies in the fight against inflation. Therefore, they are advised to follow 
anti-inflation policies by controlling exchange rate and interest rate variables. It can 
be commented that it is not possible to stabilize the exchange rate in the struggle 
against inflation and to control interest rates as a more effective tool.             
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